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THE PRESIDENTIAL BUSINESS CYCLE IN THE U.S.: 
A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION 
RANJIT S. DIGHE 
HONORS SEMINAR 
2/23/87 
The idea of a poli~ically-motivated business cycle is basically 
a conspiracy theory: "office-motivated"1 politicians, seeking to 
exploit the well-documented2 relationship between favorable 
economic news and votes for the incumbent president and his party, 
manipulate the timing of business cycles for their own electoral gain. 
This manipulation, theorists maintain, is effected through the use of 
any of several policy instruments including discretionary federal 
spending, government transfer payments, and the average tax rate, as 
well as pressure on the central bank to pursue a more accommodating 
monetary policy. 
Theories of such a cycle seem to fall in and out of favor with 
each passing presidential election. William Nordhaus's pioneering 
paper, "The Political Business Cycle" (1975), emerged in the aftermath 
of Richard Nixon's 1972 re-election campaign, which even a former 
Nixon speechwriter described as a case of "open[ing] the sluices and 
let[tingJ the dollars flow. "3 Edward Tufte, author of Political 
Control of the Economy, an in-depth analysis of the interdependence 
of economics and elections, has. acknowledged that Nixon's re-electi.on 
was the inspiration for his book as well. 4 Currently, after the 
supply shocks of the mid- and late-1970s, which in 1980 resulted in a 
(presidential) election-year recessionS for the first time since 
1960, "there has been relatively little theoretical work on the political 
business cycle' for several years."6 With the re-election of Ronald 
Reagan in 1984, however, after which some observers claimed they detected 
a political cycle behind the economic growth patterns of the 1981-84 
period7 , the next few years may well see a resurgence of political 
1 
l 
business cycle (PBC) l iterature. 
In keeping with the present lull in new PBC theories, many 
economists, in reviews of PBC literature and elsewhere, have been 
sharply critical of the previous empirical work in this area. James Alt 
and K. Alec Crystal, in their 1983 book Political Economics. conclude 
a chapter on PBC' s by noting, "No one could read the political business 
cycle literature without being struck by the lack of supporting 
evidence."B Severa l other studies, including those of McCallum 
(197B), Hibbs (1977 and 1978), Golden - Poterba (1980) and Beck (1982 
and 1984), reJect the notion of a PBC. 9 Joseph Sulock recently 
conducted replications of several PBC models, all of whose original 
authors found evidence of a PBC, and reported that most of these models, 
when updated into the 1970s or even when truncated into a timeframe when 
political manipUlation appeared most likely, performed poorly. Sulock 
admits, however, that the poor performance of these models may have been 
due to flaws in the models themselves rather than in the idea behind 
them. 
Although much of the criticism of past empirical work on the PBC 
is well deserved -- indeed, some of these models are shockingly inept 
a review of both the theoretical and empirical literature on this 
subJect will be necessary before moving on. 
Review of the Literature 
The tradittonal Keynesian conception of government as a benevolent 
institution that pursues a stabilizing countercyclical policy has long 
come under fire, perhaps most notably by conservatives such as Milton 
Friedman and James Buchanan; but the first well-known dissent that 




overtly Marxist article by Michael Kalecki in 1943. In his article 
Kalecki describes a cycle, which he said would be inevitable in a 
capitalist democracy, such that in a slump, the government undertakes 
new public investment Iinanced by borrowing so as to prevent massive 
unemployment. "But iI attempts are made to apply this method in order 
to maintain the high level OI employment reached in the subsequent boom, 
a strong opposition OI 'business leaders'" -- who do not want a Iull -
employment regime because workers with secure Jobs would become too 
demanding and disruptive, rather than being the docile labor Iorce they 
would preIer -- "is likely to be encountered." Since big business and 
the rentier interests have the government in their collective back 
pocket, Kalecki asserts, their resistance to a Iull-employment policy 
would Iorce the government to cut the budget deIicit, thereby causing 
another slump, which would touch OII yet another cycle. 10 
Clearly, Kalecki's theory OI a PBC bears little resemblance to the 
"oIIice-motivated" PBC described on page one, but a paper that appeared 
four years later by Johann Akerman did indeed suggest that presidential 
elections were a causal Iactor in the timing OI economic cycles. The 
heart OI Akerman's paper is an empirical test using as its economic 
indicator a quarterly index OI industrial stock values covering the 
timeframe !830-1945 in the U.S. As with Kalecki, Akerman's conclusion 
diIfers sharply from present-day PBC theory, as he Iinds: 
The election year spells hesitancy and a shortening of perspectives 
affecting investment and employment; when the political question is 
settled through the outcome OI the election, enterprise will grow 
cumulativelv until the next election is Ioreshadowed, causing less 
optimistic ~nticipations, and hence crisis and depression.!! 
In Akerman' s view, then, PBC's have nothing to do with government policy 
and everything to do with investor conIidence. Whether or not his 
conclusion is a valid one, it should not be too surprising that his 
3 
findings are so directly in contradiction with mod~rn PBC theory, since 
the latter generally covers the post-World War II, post-Keynes era. 
Although Kalecki and Akerman studied political-economic cycles from 
perspectives vastly different from those of recent PBC theorists, their 
work is relevant in that it established political business cycles as a 
subJect of political-economic interest, thus laying the groundwork for 
Nordhaus, Tufte, et al. 
As mentioned earlier, Nordhaus's 1975 article is commonly cited as 
the watershed paper for present-day PBC theory. Taking his cue from 
Anthony Downs (1957), who theorized that Adam Smith's self-interest 
axiom applies equally well to politics as it does to economics 12, 
Nordhaus begins by making the assumption that political parties are 
solely interested in election outcomes, and that "[tlhe government 
therefore chooses economic policies during its incumbency which maximize 
its plurality in the next election. "13 In addition . he assumes that: 1) 
voters hase their electoral decision on the rates of unemployment and 
inflation at election time, preferring both to be as low as possible; 
2) governments are aware of this fact; and 3) governments are able to 
manipulate movements along (and, to a lesser extent, shifts in) short-
run Phillips eSP) curves. Moreover, an implicit assumption behind his 
model is that the "government" as a whole is dominated by the wishes of 
the incumbent president's party. 
Having made these assumptions, Nordhaus graphically constructs a 
long - run "aggregate voting function," on which he then superimposes 
modified short- and long-run Phillips curve constraints. 
The exact slopes of the voting function and Phillips curves are 
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cost curves or "iso-vote lines," as he calls ' them -- all of which are 
concave from th e origin because the "goods" represented by the K- and y -
aKes are undesirable rather than desirable. That is to say, the 
government maKimizes its utility by being on as low an iso-vote line as 
possible: hence the government manipulates shifts in and movements 
along the SP curves in s~ch a m~nner that the lowest possible iso - vote 
line -- or r~ther, the highest possible vote share -- is attained. The 
The SP curve at a given point in time, which the incumbent cannot shift 
substantially, provides a constraint similar to that of a budget line in 
a normal iso-cost curve model. As in micro theory, the incumbent, whom 
Nordhaus assumes to be a vote- maximizer and also to be aware of the 
relative inflation-unemployment preferences of voters, will always 
choose the point on the SP curve tangent to the iso-vote line. 
Furthermore, by Joining all the possible outcomes, we get the election 
outcome line 00 (which corresponds to .the long-run production path for 
a firm), pictured in the second of the above figures. 
5 
Since macro theory tells us that a system of Phillips curves is 
only stable when the economy is at "a point on the long-run Phillips CLP) 
curve, then the only stable equilibrium in the second of the above 
figures is at point E3 , where the election outcome line intersects the 
LP curve. The optimal equilibrium would be E* <inked in), where the 
iso-vote line is tangent to the LP curve and the vote share roughly 
51.57., but the government never reaches this point because it is not on 
the election outcome line. CNordhaus does not adequately explain why 
the government would choose to follow the election outcome line in the 
first place rather than move to E* and stay there14 ; this is one of the 
maJor shortcomings of his paper.) Since inflation is considerably 
* higher at F3 than at E and unemployment slightly lower at E3 than 
at E*, Nornhaus draws the conclusion that "the democratic outcome has 
lower unemployment and higher inflation than the optimum. "15 
After outlining this long-run theory of a political economy, all of 
which he assumes to take p l ace during a homogenous electoral regime, 
Nordhaus turns to the possibility of politically- motivated cycles in the 
short run. As in th e long - run model, he assumes that voters are solely 
concerned with two economic variables, inflation and unemployment; but 
here he makes the additional assumption that they consider the values of 
these two variables over the entire electoral period, rather than merely 
at election time. He further postUlates a vote function in which voters 
"have a decaying 'memory' of past events. On election day, memory of 
recent events is probably more poignant than that of ancient ills. "16 In 
other words, voters are both backward-looking and "myopic." Nordhaus 
describes a PBC as follows: 
immediately after the election the victor will raise 
unemployment to some relatively high level in order to combat 
inflation. As elections approach, the unemployment rate will be 
6 
lowered until, on election eve, the unemploy~ent rate will be 
lowered to the purely myopic point. 17 
He illustrates this cycle with the following figure, one which appears 
frequently in PBC literature: 
Inflationflate 
.(Per cent) 
,0"; " ', ... . '_' ~~~~~,tion Ii' 0 
.......... '1 .... , _, "" ... ' 4.0 








The political business cycle (Nordhaus, p. 185) 
Since his long-run theoretical prediction, "that the politically 
determined policy choice will have lower unemployment and higher 
inflation than is optimal," would be too difficult to test, Nordhaus 
opts instead to conduct a crude test of whether the short-run cycle 
descrihed above actually exists. For this empirical test, he uses data 
for unemp l oyment rates and elections in nine democratic countries --
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Sweden, the 
U,K. and the U.S. over the postwar time span 1947-1972. His test' s 
hypothesis, which he states rather vaguely, is that "during an 
electora l period of length 0, the unemployment rate should rise in 
the first 0/2 years and fall in the second 0/2 years, "18 as well as the 
assumptions that the probability of the unemployment rate rising or 
falling in any period is one-half and that successive occurences are 
statistically independent of one another. 
Calculating a binomial probability of the observed unemployment 
trends happening due to chance, he finds a strong coincidence of 
7 
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unemployment and political cycles for three countries -- Germany, New 
Zealand and the U.S. For the U.S., he reports nine observations that 
conform with his hypothesis and only one that does not. The cumulative 
binomial probability of this pattern pccuringby chance is 0.011 (out 
of 1). 
Of all the nine countries studied, the U.S results appear to be the 
most convincing evidence of a PBC, and as such they are widely cited by 
other PBC theorists; but closer examination reveals them to be somewhat 
spur:i.ous. Nordhaus himself admits in a footnote that "the assumption of 
.. 
independence is probably not warranted," so long as any external 
business cycle exists at all. 19 Also, Nordhaus's assumption that the 
probability of a rise or fall in unemployment is exactly one - half 
creates another problem: What if the overall trend in unemployment in a 
a period was neither up nor down? 
After attempting to replicate this test exactly, I found three 
periods (1959-60, 1961-62 and 1967-68) in which unemployment stayed 
basically the same. Rather than include these as observations not 
conforming with the theory, however, Nordhaus slyly discards them. Had 
he put forth a strict null hypothesis of the form 
Ho: unemployment does not rise in the first 0/2 years; 
unemployment does not fall in the second 0/2 years, 
he would not have had that luxury. Moreover, the cumulative binomial 
l probability of the resulting new pattern (9 conforming observations, 4 
non-conforming observations) occuring by chance is 0.133 still low 
enough to encourage further research, but not low enough to be even 
semi-conclusive. 
Updating the observations through 1984 and using the most current 






Unemployment rate not falling 4 
Unemployment rate falling* 6 
After elections 
Total 
Unemployment rate rising* 6 
Unemployment rate not rising 3 
Conforms with theory* 
Does not conform with theory 
PROBABILITY OF THESE TOTALS 




* - indicates the movement that conforms with the theory 
The above table is adapted from Nordhaus. 
Since Nordhaus does not specify exactly what he means by "rising" 
or "falling" over a two-year period, I used my own specifications in 
replicating his test. I used quarterly data, comparing the final 
qu~rters of successive two-year periods and taking any change in the 
unemployment "rate of less than 0.21 to be sci miniscule as to count 
as neither a rise nor fall. 
Thus, after including all observations from 1947-72 and updating 
through 1984, the results become somewhat less promising. This is 
hardly surprising, given the supply shocks of the 1970s; but I strongly 
doubt that Nordhaus meant for his test to be conclusive. For one thing, 
his test is supposed to show coincidence (of political and economic 
cycles), not causality. Moreover, because of imprecise measurement 
techniques, the unemployment rate is often an unreliable indicator of 
economic activity. In short, Nordhaus seems to have intended for his 
test to invite further research rather than pre-empt it. 
In his book Political Control of the Economy (1978), Edward Tufte 
looks for evidence of electoral-economic cycles on the supply side (the 
manipulation and timing of policy instruments and therefore of business 
cycles) and the demand side (the effect of macro aggregates on votes 
cast for the incumbent president and/or his party) and claims to find 
evidence of both. Since this paper focuses on the supply-side aspects of 
a PBC, I will ignore Tufte's work on the demand side for now. Tufte's 
9 
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work on the supply side involves nothing more complicated than the 
computation of various totals and averages for annual economic data. 
In one table, Tufte displays the variations in the inflation -
unemployment tradeoff in relation to presidential election years in the 
31 years from 1946 to 1976. Judging from his findings, the economy 
performs a good deal better during presidential election years t~an in 
all other years. IJpdating the data through 1985 and fitting the resu l ts 
into a table identical to Tufte's, we get: 
Yearly change in unemployment 
rate and inflation (GNP 
deflator: 
less unemployment 
and less inflation 
less unemployment, 
hut more inflation 
less inflation, 
but more unemployment 
more inflation 




50Y. (5 years) 
lOY. (1 year) 
30Y. (3 years) 
lOY. (1 year) 
100Y. 
(Percentage of) 
All other years 
l3Y. (4 years) 
33Y. (10 years) 
37Y. (11 years) 
l7Y. (5 years) 
lOOY. 
"It is apparent that the way to defeat the trade-off between 
inflation and unemployment is to hold a presidential election" 
-Edward Tufte20 
Unlike the Nordhaus test on page 9, Tufte's table is little changed 
by the addition of observations from 1977-85. And, excluding 1980 
when the economy was beset by oil shocks, there has never been a 
presidential election year in which the rates of inflation and 
unemployment both increased relative to the previous year. 
Tufte identifies the annual growth rate of real disposable income 
per capita as the economic variable that most affects the share of votes 
receiv~d by the president and his party, and he looks at annual data for 
this variable in analyzing patterns on the supply side as well. This is 
10 
a mistake, because even though public-policy actions may well influence 
changes in real disposable income (RDI), the government clearly has no 
precise knowledge of or control over the future population level. 
Nonetheless, Tufte shows that movements in per-capita RDI are indeed 
closely correlated with on-year and off-year (midterm) elections. Over 
the years 1946-1976, the median growth rate of RDI per capita has averaged 
3.3% in years when an incumbent president sought re-election, as compared 
to Just 1.7% in all other years.21 Furthermore, over the same timespan, 
excluding the Eisenhower years (because, according to Tufte, Eisenhower' s 
was the one postwar Administration that genuinely reJected stimulative 
interventionist policies), Tufte finds the following median growth rates 










Midterm On-year election, 
election incumbent running 
2.8% 
Tufte's findings for unemployment data are similar. Plotting 
seasonally adJusted monthly unemployment rates for the terms of all 
presidents from Truman through Ford and again excluding the Eisenhower 
years, we see that unemployment was moving downward before five of the 
six remaining presidential elections. Including the Eisenhower years, 
unemployment was moving upward after seven of eight elections. 
Given these fluctuations in per-capita RDI and the unemployment 
rate, Tufte writes, "The electoral cycle causes substantial 
macroeconomic fluctuations. "23 As Tufte should know, however, 
coincidence does not always imply causality, so we should take this 
statement with the grain of salt it deserves. Yet~ despite this 
distinction, the coincidences Tufte reports are impressive: 
-- A two-year cycle in the growth of real disposable income per 
11 
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capita, with accelerations in even-numbered years [election years) 
and deceleartions in odd-numbered years. 
-- A four-year presidential cycle in the unemployment rate, with 
downturns in unemployment [0£ about one percentage point) in the 
months before the president~al election and upturns in the 
unemployment rate rof nearly two percentage points] usually 
beginning from twelve to eighteen months after the election. 24 
According to Tu£te, the two cycles involve dif£eren~ policy 
instruments. The two-year cycle "is especially the product bf election -
year increases in transfer payments, administrative messing around with 
the timing of beneficiary payments, and decreases or postponements of 
taxes ... The sur.cess£ul maintenance of the two-year real income cycle 
is not much morp subtle than getting a lot of checks in the mail 
before the first Tuesday in November. "25 Tu£te displays some interesting 
circumstantial evidence of the "heaping" of transfer payment s around 
October or Novemb~r in four recent election years. He also finds that 
of the thirtpen increases in Social Security benefits since 1950, nine 
of them have come in election years; moreover, eight of those nine 
benefit increases have been within~year increases rather than beginning -
of-year increases, whereas three of the four benefit increases in odd-
numbered years came at the beginning of the year in January. 26 
Tufte provides less evidence to support his contention that 
politicians engender a four-year presidential cycle as well. He reports 
that such a cycle is more unwieldy than the , two-year congressional cycle 
because the unemployment rate "is af£ected by fiscal and monetary 
policies that act more slowly and with more uncertain time lags on 
unemployment than do taxes and transfers on real disposable income. "27 
Aside from some political science/psychology theory to explain why 
government bureaucrats and opposition members o£ Congress would 
cooper~te with a presidential-election-year economic stimulatLon, 
however, the only evidence Tufte provides of policy· manipulation on this 
12 
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front is a table of biennial changes in the growth rate of Ml. He 
reports that the relatioship between these changes in the money supply 
and presidential elections is a strong one, ~s the table below 
(reproduced from Tufte) indicates: 
CHANGES IN M1, TWO-YEAR PERIODS, 1948-197628 
(excluding the Eisenhower years) 
Rate of growth of 
Ml increased 
Rate of" growth of 
M1 decreased 
Biennial periods 








As strong as this evidence appears, it may be somewhat spurious, 
principally because the government's ability to control accelerations 
and decelerations of the growth rate rate of M1 is in some doubt. Also, 
the money stock is a target of monetary policy, not an instrument of 
policy. (The aggregate level of bank reserves and the federal funds 
rate are examples of monetary policy instruments. 29 ) Perhaps assessing the 
manipulations of, say, the level of non-borrowed reserves in the 
banking system in relation to presidential election cycles would be a 
more illuminating test of monetary policy. 
The most comprehensive work on the subJect of PBC's has been by 
Bruno Frey of Switzerland. Frey postulates two equations, a popularity 
function (by which popularity is influenced by the rates of 
U unemployment, inflation and RDI growth, as well as personal factors) and 
a reaction function which takes into account the proximity of the next 
election and the popularity rating of the president in order to predict 
government behavior. I will concentrate on Frey's reaction function for 
1 3 
now. 
In contrast to the vote - maximizing theory that Nordhaus assumes, 
Frey and Schneider (1978) hypothesize that presidents follow a more 
realistic vote-satisficing strategy. In addition they assume that a 
president derives his utility from pursuing his ideological goals. The 
need to be re-elected is seen as a constraint on the implementation of 
this ideology rather than as an end in itself. Frey and Schneider 
acknowledge, however, that the desire to remain in power is the most 
important constraint on politicians' behavior; and thus they hypothesize 
that if a president's approval rating30 is below a certain threshold level, 
the pre~ident will undertake expansionary policies so as to raise his 
popularity level and thereby secure his re-election. Although the 22nd 
Amendment to the Constitution prevents any president from serving more 
than two terms, the authors maintain that even second term presidents 
"are under strong pressure from their party to pursue policies ~ if 
they were seeking another term. This is an attempt to ensure that their 
successor will be a member of their own party. "31 
Frey and Schneider arbitrarily set the target popularity rating 
* (POP ) sought by presidents at the constant level of 5BX and talk of a 
"state of popularity deficit" equal to (actual popularity rating - POP*) 
that occurs when actual popularity (POP) is less than the target level. 
Assuming further that the government will react more strongly to a large 
l' popularity deficit than to a small one, they use the squared popularity 
deficit as an explanatory variable in their reaction function. The 
entire reaction function is as follows: 
GXCt) = POGXCt-4) + (constant) + P1(government receipts) 
+ P2Cpopularity deficit)2 
+ P3Ctime before elections) 
14 
+ P4(each president's ideology) + u(t) 
where GX = total nondefense federal expenditures (nominal, in billions 
of dollars); time before elections = dummy variable, TBE, which equals 0 
in the first half and takes the values 1,2~3, •.. ,8 starting with the 
beginning o£ the second half of each presidential term (TBE = 0 if 
POP> POp*); ideology = (POP - POP*)2 if (POP> POP*) 
and equals 0 if (POP ~ POp*). Frey and Schneider estimate similar 
reaction functions for the level of transfer payments and the number of 
federal Jobs as well. 
Their estimation of the above reaction function for GX, using 
quarterly data from 1953/11 to 1975/11, yield~ positive values for P2 
and P3" The positive signs conform with Frey's and Schneider's 
theoretical expectations (of a government that reacts to a popularity 
deficit or an impending election by applying a fiscal st~mulus), but the 
estimated values for both coefficients are so low as to be economically 
-- if not statisti.cally - - insignificant. 32 The tiny value for P2 
presents no challenge to election-oriented PBC theory, however, because the 
popularity dpfi.ctt variable includes observations from all sixteen 
quarters of each presidential term, rsther than being restricted to 
observation points shortly before each election. Thus it implicitly 
tests for the ex{~tence of a "popularity maintenance function"33, in 
which a president attempts a fiscal stimulus whenever his popularity 
rating is low, regardless of the relative proximity of the next 
election. This seems unlikely to begin with, not only because the costs 
of such an irresponsible policy would seem to outweigh the benefits if 
the next election were far off, but also because, as Sulock points out, 





[this instrument1 since presidential power is also a function of ... 
popularity. "34 
The low value for P3' which predicts an increase of Just $0.37 
billion in domestic federal spending in response to a popularity deficit 
in the latter half of a presidential term, is more problematical. But 
the problem may well be with Frey's and Schneider's model rather than an 
absence of policy manipulation. The dependent variable GX seems 
misspecified, in particular because its failure to adJu~t either for 
inflation or the size of the economy. Moreover, they do not attempt a 
reaction function for federal tax collections (or the average tax rate), 
the other half of fiscal policy. Nor do they attempt to combine the two 
instruments. Thus it is possible that if some periodic electorally-
inspired cycle does exist in the use of fiscal policy instruments, 
Frey' s and Schneider's model would not pick it up. 
Furthermore, Frey himself cautions that "[tJhe approach of 
examining raw data over time is seriously defi~ient. A careful 
empirical study requires an isolation of the electoral cycle: all 
influences not connected with it must be excluded," or else the results 
either way may be spurious. 35 Indeed, failure to account for such 
exogenous factors as wars and supply shocks is likely to obscure one' s 
results considerably. 
In a 1.983 article Kabir Ahmad makes several incisive criticisms of 
Frey's and Schneider's reaction functions and estimates two policy 
functions of his own, one for fiscal policy and one for monetary policy. 
The respecti~e policy instruments he examines are th~ real high 
employment (or "structural") budget deficit divided by real GNP 
CRHEBD/GNP) and the rate of growth of Ml. In addition, his model 
contains three explanatory variables for the state of the economy -- the 
16 
lagged values of rea l income, unemployment a nd inflation -- as we ll as 
the lagged values of the particular policy instruments themselves 
(Pet-I». By including these economic variables, Ahmad seems to be 
heeding Prey's warning that one needs to isolate the electoral cycl e 
from all exogenous factors in order to conduct a proper PSC test. 
The two reaction functions that Ahmad does introduce are otherwise 
quite similar to Prey's and Schneider's. The explanatory variab les he 
uses for e ach policy equation are: a constant term; the lagged (by one 
quarter) values of the rates of inflation, unemployment and real GNP 
growth; the lagged popularity deficit, PO; the lagged popularity 
surplus ( s eparated from PO in order to focus on PO); and a disturbance 
term. 
Unfortunately, Ahmad does not include a time-before-elections 
variable of any kind; thus the critical coefficient values in both tests 
are those of the popularity deficit, the theoretical improbability of 
which I have already discussed. He hypothesizes that the coefficient 
s ign of PD in the fiscal policy equation will be positive and that the 
coefficient s ign of PO in the monetary test will be interdeterminate, 
because the central bank might choose to assert its independence in the 
face of executive pressure or because the president might prefer a tight 
money policy so that inflation will be low at election time. 
Performing regressions on his own model and Frey's and Schneider' s 
1978 model, and expanding the data series from to 1953-1975 to 1948-
L 1978, Ahmad shows Prey's and Schneider's model to be extremely sensitive 
to the sa mple period selected. After expanding the timeframe in this 
manner, th e R2 of their GX model drops from 0.99 to 0.50. Ahmad 
reports that his own mode l of fiscal policy gives much better results, 
17 
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since he gets a higher R2 (0.80, or 0.83 when the ideological 
dummy variables are included in the regression) and statistically 
significant coefficient estimates for income growth, popularity deficit 
and the lagged endogenous variable P(i)(t-l). He reports satisfactory 
results for his monetary reaction function, when presidential dummies 
are included -- an R2 of 0.60 and significant coeffic~ent values for 
inflation, unemployment, popularity deficit and the lagged endogenous 
variable PCii)Ct-1). The coefficient estimate for PO in the money 
supply equat.ion is negat.ive, however. Taken together, Ahmad's t.wo 
react.ion functions imply that a president with a popularity shortfal l 
will pursue an expansionary fiscal policy and a contractionary monet.ary 
policy. 
Not only does it seem unlikely that. a president would choose to 
undertake two po l icies that cancel each other out, but Ahmad does not 
make any attempt to explain why this might be the case. In addi t ion, 
like Frey and Schneider, he does not discuss the economic significance 
of his respective estimates for PO -- 0.00002 and -0.063 -- aside from 
noting that they are statistically significant at the 51 level. The PD 
estimate for the fiscal equation seems slight: assuming that GNP is 
roughly $1.5 trillion (its 1983 ~alue in 1972 doLlars), then a president. 
with a ten-point popularity deficit will react by increasing the 
structural deficit by $300 million, a trifling amount when one considers 
that the st.ructural deficit is measured in billions. The PO estimate 
for monetary policy appears a good deal more significant, but Ahmad's 
explanations for why it could be negative are not convincing. If 
"office - motivated" presidents pursue contractionary policies in order to 
improv~ their immediate popularity, then they are irrational, because 
the rates of "unemployment and growth of income together [have] by far a 
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greater impact on presidential popularity than [does) inflation. "36 
The "popularity maintenance theory" implied by the popularity 
deficit variables in Frey's and Schneider's and Ahmad's models seems so 
unlikely in terms of cost - benefit analysis (see page 17) and receives so 
37 little supporting evidence in the empirical testing of these models 
that this paper will consider it no further. 
A 1986 paper by stuart Allen tests econometrically whether or not 
a periodic politj.cal cycle exists in monetary policy-making. In 
separate regressions he uses one of two dependent variables: the first 
difference of the log, of the monetary base, and the growth rate of MI. 
Using ten different specifications of electoral dummy variables, so as 
to allow for a number of possible electorally-motivated policy cycles, 
Allen runs separate regressions for four different (but overlapping) 
time periods and for each of the ten electoral variables. Allen's 
results for all forty regressions are so unimpressive that he concludes 
no evidence exists for an electoral cycle in the growth of MI. 
Allen reports more positive results for a second specification, 
which indicates that the Fed's willingness to monetize the public debt 
varies with the presidential and congressional election cycles. His 
model includes terms for the change in net federal debt (DEBT) and an 
election cycle-debt interaction term (EVDEBT), equal to the electoral 
dummy times the debt variable. He reports positive coefficients for 
DEBT and negative coefficients for EVDEBT, the theoretically expected 
signs, and statistically significant v~lues for those coefficients. He 
concludes: 
The results provide evidence that the Federal Reserve not only 
accommodates Treasury borrowing regardless of the electoral season, 
but also provides extra accommodation prior to presidential and 
congressional elections. 38 
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The coeff i cient estimates of EVDEBT that correspond to Allen's 
specifications of a two-year cycle are a good deal larger than those 
corresponding to a four - year cycle. Hence the indirect link that Allen 
sees between monetary accommodation and national elections may be 
stronger for congressiona l elections than for presidential elections. 
My own test will consider both possibilities as well. 
After going over some of the most often cited ~orks in PBC 
literatlJre, my strongest conclusion is that these works tend to be long 
on theory and short on solid evidence of a PBC, despite their authors' 
contentions. As Su l ock puts it, too often "the induced changes are, at 
best, 'economically non-negligible. ,"39 The results pertaining to changes 
in such macroaggregates as real GNP, RDI and the unemployment rate in 
relation to electoral cycles seem a good deal more revealing than the 
estimated reactions of policy instruments to elections. Desp i te this 
asymmetry, however, in my own work I will try to analyze both of these 
aspects of a PBC, because the latter would seem to be the most likely 
cause of the former. 
Theoretical Framework 
Although my empirical tests will allow for the possibjlity of a 
two-year congressiona l economic cycle, I will be focusing mai nl y bn the 
possible existence of a four-year "presidential business cycle." 
Despite Tufte's findings that ROI per capita grew much faster in midterm 
election years than in years with no election at all, it is nonetheless 
true that since 1947, there have been five midterm election years ( 1954, 
, 58, , 70, ' 74 and ' 82) in which real GNP declined from the previous 
year, as opposed to only one presidential election year (1980) in which 




short-run Phillips curves to any extent, as I assume it would, two years 
seems far too short a time period in which to complete any such cycle. 
There are three basic assumptions underlying my theory of a 
presidential business cycle: 1) voters base thei~ electoral decisions 
largely on the economic conditions at election time; 2) politicians have 
some ability to manipulate the economy through fiscal· and monetary 
policy; 3) a president's first duty (to paraphrase Adlai Stevenson) is 
to get re - elected or to see his party's nominee elected president. In 
the following pages I will explore these assumptions in greater depth. 
1. Voters base their eleotoral deoisions .largely on the eoonomio 
oonditions at eleotion time. If politicians did not believe this were 
true, they would have little incentive to stimulate the economy before 
an electi.on. Fortunately for PBC theorists, the evidence suggests that 
levels and movements of economic vari~bles have a profound impact on 
electoral outcomes. 
Ray Fair (1975) found that voters apply an infinite discount rate 
in assessi.ng the economic performance of prior presidential 
administrations. That is to say, they consider only the past four-year 
performance of the economy under the current administration in rendering 
their decision. Furthermore, after testing fourteen different economic 
variables as possible explanatory variables for the incumbent party's 
share of the two-party vote in presidential contests, Fair writes, "The 
growth rate of real per capita GNP, gi' in the year of the election 
[emphasis added] was definitely the best measure of economic performance 
in terms of explaining" the vote share. 40 For the time period 1916-1972, 
gi explains 7B.4Y. of the variance in vote share (i.e., R2 = 0.784). 
Thus Fair's results imply that voters are myopic to an extreme -- they 
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consider only the events of the most recent year of the current 
administration. 
In constructing his model of voting behavior, Fair assumed that 1) 
"voters hold presidential administrations accountable for economic 
events" and 2) a voter bases his or her expectation of the future 
economic performance of the incumbent party's candidate on some measure 
of his party's past economic performance. 41 Both of these assumptions 
seem plausible enough to incorporate into my own underlying theory; and, 
applying Fai-r's above conclusions, we can extend the second assumption 
to be: a voter bases his or her expectations of the futtire economic 
performance of the incumbent party's candidate on the economic events of 
the election year. 
These assumptions go against the "rational expectations" hypothesis 
which holds that "people form their expectations on the basis of all 
information, including any available information on the probable future 
t " f I" 1. "42 btl b 1" th f 1" bl ae 10ns o. po lcyma~ers - - u e 1eVe ey orm a p aUSl e 
description of voting behavior. For on~ thing, as Chris Goodrich has 
noted, "the average voter is not a sophisticated econometrician" and is 
not able "to estimate the profile of the economy over the electoral 
term. Moreover, he is also not able to distinguish between government -
induced actions and other influences upon the economy" such as supply 
h 1. 43 s oc~s. In addition, it seems unreasonable to expect voters who 
haven't taken a macro theory course to understand the dynamic properties 
of short- and long-run Phillips curves - - that is, for them to know that 
today's hi-gh growth rate may be tomorrow's inflation. And given the 
relative insignificance of one individual's vote in a presidential 
e lection (where the average margin of victory in postwar times has been 
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roughly eight million votes), the benefit one would derive from 
obtaining and learning to interpret all available economic information 
in order to vote "correctly" seems negligible compared to the costs of 
acquiring this information. 
In addition, Frey claims his statistical estimates reveal that the 
voters' time horizon rarely goes back much further than one year in any 
country. Goodrich comments that 
such empirical studies as have been undertaken, both outside and 
through the popularity function over a broad range of countries and 
time, have shown that the electorate tends to be myopic. It has an 
incredibly short memory, and tends to be remarkably ignorant about 
the state of economic affairs ••• 44 
In support of these claims, one might note that in the postwar U.S., 
real GNP declined during the second or third years of six presidential 
terms, yet the incumbent president won re-election in four out of these 
six cases. By contrast, the incumbent president's party has never 
retained control of the White House in a postwar preSidential election 
year in which real GNP grew at a rate of less than 2.1 percent. 
Tufte and Frey also report a strong connection between favorable 
economic news and votes for the incumbent presidential candidate. 
Running a multiple reression, Tufte gets significant coefficient 
estimates indicating that every 1.0X annual increaSe in per-capita ROI 
during the election year brings the incumbent party's nominee an extra 
1.3X of the popular vote. Frey's "popularity function" also takes the 
form of a multiple regression, in which presidential popularity depends 
on the current rates of unemployment cuct» and ROl growth (GCt» and 
the lagged value of the inflation rate CICt - 1», as well as dummy 
variables for each president's base popularity level and popularity 
depreciation rate and an additionally dummy variable for the Watergate 
years (1973-74). Frey gets a value of corrected R2 of 0.9 and 
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theoretically "correct" signs for the coefficients of U(t), G(t) and 
l(t-1). His estimates of these coefficients suggest that: 1) a 1Y. 
increase in unemployment causes popularity to drop by four percentage 
points; 2) a lY. increase in inflation causes popularity to drop by four 
percentage points; and 3) a 1Y. increase in the growth rate of ROI raises 
popularity by 0.5 percent. 45 
Taken together, Fair's, Tufte's and Frey's results provide almost 
overwhelming evidence that economic conditions are a key factor in 
explaining the outcomes of presidential elections. 
2. Politicians have some ability to manipulate the economy 
through fiscal and monetary policy_ Keynesian economics takes for 
granted that fiscal and monetary policy are within the control of 
government policy-makers. Although the government's policies do not 
create the business cycle, Keynesians assert, their actions certainly 
have an impact upon business cycles and macroaggregates. Monetarism, 
the directly competing school of thought, charges that the private 
economy is inherently stable and that most if not all fluctuations in 
economic performanc~ -- that is to say, business cycles -- are 
directly traceable to governmental int~rvention. The point I am 
trying to make is that both camps agree that governmental policy 
actions have a potent effect on the economy. 
is not a controversial issue. 
For the most part, 
To go one step further as I do in assuming that politicians 
this 
(rather than unelected bureaucrats), and presidents in particular, 
direct these economic policies invites somewhat more debate. Fiscal 
policy, although it is embodied in the federal budget which Congress 
passes and the President signs into law, inevitably reflects the 
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prioritl.es of the Congress and not only those of the President, since 
it is Congress that votes for the final budget, which may differ quite 
drastically from the President's original proposal. Monetary policy is 
in the hands of a supposedly independent, non-partisan Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors that sets its own priorities. These seem to me to 
be the principal obJections to Assumption 2, and I will deal with them 
summarily in the following paragraphs. 
Before explaining why presidents exert such a strong influence on 
fiscal policy, I feel it necessary to explain how I am defining fiscal 
policy and why politicians are conscious of it. Fiscal policy involves 
total federal expenditures as measured against total federal tax 
receipts. Since downturns in the economy automatically result in 
reduced tax collections (because there is less national income to tax) 
and, to a smaller extent, increased government outlays, and economic 
upturns result in Just the opposite, the federal budget deficit has 
what is called a cyclical component. Changes in the level of this 
comporient occur naturally in response to economic fluctuations, not as 
a calcu l ated reaction on the government's part. Thus the correct 
measure of actual fiscal policy, many economists would agree, is the 
"high-employment" or "structural" federal deficit - - the estimated 
level what the deficit would be if the economy were operating at "high 
employment." i.e. the lowest sustainable unemployment rate that would 
not generate any new inflation. Estimates of the structural defici~ 
are calculated officially by the Oepartment of Commerce and 
unofficially by the Office of Management and Budget and the 
Congressional Budget Office; they were incorporated formally into the 
budget in 1972. 46 
Because the budget that Congress passes contains an estimated 
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measure of fiscal policy, it seems reasonable to assume that 
politicians have some awareness of the relative size of a particular 
fiscal st.imulus. Even prior to 1972, at least in the post-Eisenhower 
years, politicians have seemed to know that a countercyclical fiscal 
policy is better than a procyclicalone (such as the tax increase that 
President Hoover enacted in 1932 during the Depression). According to 
Paul Samuelson, Presidents Kennedy, Nixon, Ford and Carter all accepted 
the precept that the budget should be set "so that it can be financed 
by the tax revenues that a would be generated from a high-level full -
employment "47 economy. Judging from published figures for the actual 
and structural deficits during the 1950s, it appears that the 
Eisenhower Administration's primary fiscal obJective (especially in 
election years) was to maintain a balanced budget. For this reason, my 
econometric tests of the manipulation of fiscal policy will include one 
specification in which all observations from the Eisenhower years are 
excluc;fed. 
Because the postwar norm in American politics has been a 
Republican president and a Democratic-controlled Congress, one might 
question the influence that I ascribe to presidents in shaping fiscal 
policy. T believe, however, that partisan control of Congress limits a 
president's ability to conduct short-term economic policy considerably 
less than it limits his ability to achieve other obJectives, such as 
~GW@i~F1 }Julie1 SRil domestic social policy goals. Moreover, since 
Representatives are up for re-election every two years and Senators 
every six years, and assuming that they are no less interested in their 
own re-elections than the President is in his, they may well be 
inclined to go along with any fiscal stimUlus that the President 
26 
J 
proposes, even if they belong to the opposition party. After a ll, 
fiscal stimuli such as income tax cuts and spending programs affecting 
one's constituency are politically popular. Applying Downs's theory of 
political self-interest, it seems fair to postUlate that opposition 
members of Congress make their own re-elections a higher priority than 
they do the President's defeat. And studies have shown that members of 
Congress who belong to the same party as the President benefit from 
election-year economic booms in their own re-election attempts. 48 
Examples of presidents inducing an opposition-controlled Congress 
to accept a fiscal stimulus include the tax reductions of 1958, 1975 
~nd 1981, under Republican Presidents Eisenhower, Ford and Reagan, 
respectively. I n the first two cases, the Democrats had maJorities in 
both hou ses of Congress; in the third case, they had a commanding 
maJority in the House of Representatives. Moreover, even if a 
president is not in full control of fiscal policy, he still ha s the 
power to veto any spending or tax bill that Congress passes. And 
despite the fact that the budget that a president proposes each year is 
not always the same on e th a t Congress enacts, the differences between 
the proposed and final budgets probably have more to do with 
conflicting spending priorities (i.e., how to allocate the budget among 
the military, social programs, entitlements, etc.) than with 
disagreements as to the proper level of the structural deficit. 
Tufte describes the "collaboration" of presidents and opposition 
members of Congress, even opposition candidates for president, in 
e lection-year economic stimulations as follows: 
Even those not in power become implicated in election - year 
upturns. During the election campaign, nonincumbent candidates 
find themselves in the ironic postures of advocating stimulative 
economic policies as correctives for what they attack as the 
failed policies of the incumbent [administration]. Incumbents, 
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proc l aiming they are also keeping a keen e~e on inflation and 
government spending, are happy to oblige. 4 
Tufte cites as an e~ample of this pattern the 20 percent increase in 
Social Security benefits, effective October 1, 1972, that President 
Nixon signed into law in the election year 1972. Nixon had origina l ly 
proposed a 5 percent increase, in late 1971. During the primary 
election campaign the following spring, several of the Democratic 
candidates proposed upping the increase to 20 or 25 percent. In July, 
both (D~mnGratic-controlled) houses of Congress passed a 20 percent 
increase, despite hints of a presidential veto. 50 A similar example 
occurred during the Truman Administration early in the election year 
1948, when Truman enacted a tax cut bill passed by a Republican 
Congress after having vetoed two tax reduction bills the previous 
year. 5l 
In short, it seems h i ghly plausible that opposition members of 
Congress would not only go along with a president's attempts at 
election-y~ar fiscal stimulation, but that they might even initiate 
such an attempt. 
As for monetary policy, numerous economists h~ve questioned the 
degree to which the Fed is really independent of the political process. 
The Federal Reserve Board, as we know, consists of seven governors, all 
appointed to staggered fourteen-year terms by the President with the 
advice and consent of the Senate. Although fourteen years i s 
considerably longer than the legal limit of a president's tenure in 
[ office, most Board members retire before half of their fourteen-year 
t rm . ~ \Jfl.52 .. e 1"" In addition, the Chairm~rt's term as chairman is only four 
years; giving each President the opportunity to appoint a chairman of 
his own choosing. Thomas Mayer states that "the President and Congress 
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have considerable influence over the Fed" and gives four reasons why 
this is so: 
One source of the government' s influence is moral suasion; the 
governors are reluctant to oppose the views of the one person 
elected by the whole nation; they go along if they feel they can 
do so without dereliction of duty. Second, the Fed is continually 
active in Congress, trying to obtain certain legislation or to 
hlock other legislation. It wants the support of the President in 
these legislative struggles, and hence has an incentive to keep on 
goorl terms with him. Third, the Chairman wants the President's 
goodwill, so that when the President appoints a new governor, it 
wi]] he someone the chairman prefers .•.. Moreover, to ward off 
undesired legislation and to obtain the legislation it does want, 
the Federal Reserve probably bends at least to some extent to 
Congressional pressures. 53 
Ever s ince it established the Fed in 1913, Congress traditiona l ly 
ha s played a "watchdog" role in supervising its activities. Th e 
operational guidelines it gave the Fed were exceedingly vague up until 
recently, but it ha s always had the powe~ to enact laws altering th e 
Fed's charter or curtailing the Fed's independence. If the threat of 
such legislation is st~ong enough, then th~ Fed may be forced into a 
change of policy (assumin~, of course, that the Fed, as a bureaucracy, 
derives its utility from staying as powerful and autonomou s as 
possible). Furthermore, since 1975, the Chairman of the Board of 
Governors js required to appear twice a year before Congress to state 
and explain his annual growth targets for Mi, M2 and M3, thu s making 
Congressiona l supervision of monetary policy more direct. 
Sherman Maisel, a former member of the Board of Governors, once 
estimated the distribution of power over Fed policy among outsiders as: 
presidential administration - 351; Congress - 251; the press, 
economists, l obbyists and the general p~blic - 201; financial interests 
- ]0%; foreign intere~ts - 51; other regulatory agencies - 5%.54 Thus 
Mai se l be l ieves the President and Congress together exert a potent 
influence on monetary policy. His estimates do not compare the 
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relative influence of these outsiders to that of Fed insiders, but a 
1978 paper by Robert Weintraub provides compelling evidence of the 
active role that presidential regimes play in monetary policy - making . 
Weintraub constructs several measures of monetary "thrust" -- a 
concept that is explained further following the table below -- year by 
year from 1951 to 1977. He finds that 
the Federal Reserve shifted course in the fundamenta l sense, 
easi ng or t i.ghten i ng significantly in 1953, 1961, 1.971., 1.974 an d 
1977. Except for 1971., these were the only years when the 
PresidencY , changed hands. Considering further that the thrust of 
monetary policy, which began to ease in 1961, eased significantly 
during Johnsori's presidency from its first year (1964>, it may be 
reasonably urged that the dominant force behind monetary policy is 
the President. 55 
Weintraub further supports this claim with a table of monetary 
policy thrust in the presidencies of this timeframe. I have reproduced 
this table in the space below: 
MONETARY POLICY THRUST IN EACH PRESIDENT'S TERM, 1951-1977 
President 








Thrl.lst 1. = 
Thrust 2 = 
Thrust 3 = 
Thrust. 4 = 
Dates of term 
(3 ) (4 ) 
3/51 - 12/52 4.75 0.80 0.81 0.77 
1/53 - 12/60 1. 73 -2.32 -2.30 -2.28 
1/61 - 10/63 2.31 -1. 82 -1. 78 -1.. 71 
11/63 - 12/68 4.78 0.77 0.82 0.79 
1/69 - 7/74 6.17 2. 11 2. 18 2.17 
8/74 - 12/76 4.76 0.53 0.61 0.74 
1/77 - 11/77 6.61 2.41 2.50 2.59 
Average percent change in Ml, from monthly data, at 
annual ;rate 
Thrust 1. - r4.0 + 0.0625(Ut ~ 1 - 4)] 
Thrust 1 - [4.0 + 0.0625(Ut _ l - 4 
+ time*O.003115*1.5)] 
Thrust 1. - [4.0 + 0.0625(logUt _ 1 
- 10g(4 + time*0.003115*1.5)] 
Thrust 2 allows for countercyclical money-growth policY , as regards 
unemployment (Ut - 1 ). It assumes that 4.0 is the structual or 
"natural" unemployment rate. The coefficient 0.0625 is three 
times the maximum fraction of the unemployed in excess of 4 
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percent that the economy can absorb in one month, according to 
Okun's Law. 
Thrust 3 recognizes that the structural unemployment rate may have 
risen steadily over the given timeframe, from 4.0X in March 1951 
(where time = 1) to 5.5X in November 1977 (time = 321). 
Thrust 4 uses logarithms so as nto allow for absorbing higher 
fractions of the unemployed in excess of the [structural] 
unemployment rate as unemployment increases. n56 
Whichever measure of thrust one looks at, however, the inescapable 
conclusion one draws from Weintraub' s table is that monetary policy 
changed significantly with the advent of every new postwar presidential 
administration. Not only did it change with successive presidencies, 
Weintraub adds, hut n[eJxamination of the economic and financial 
histori es of the administrations of ••• Truman and his successors 
show[s] that in each administration monetary policy fitted harmoniously 
with the President's economic and financial obJecti.ves and plans. n57 
Despite this evidence, however, the separate contention that the 
Fed responds to an administration's electoral "priorities has yet to be 
thoroughly tested, let alone proven. My own empirical work will 
attempt to test this cl a im. For now, the relevant question i s whether 
or not politicians exert some control over monetary policy-making 
(as in Assumption 2 ); and I believe the above evidence suggests they 
do. 
Few doubt that fiscal and monetary policy, together and even 
separately, have a pronounced impact on the U.S. economy. It is true, 
however, that the magnitude of this impact at any point in time will vary 
considerably with the prior economic and national conditions. In times 
of war, fiscal and monetary policies tend to be oriented towards 
providing maximum support for the war effort. Examples of such include 
the interest-rate pegging during World War II and the Korean War and 




shifts in the short - run Phillips curves exacerbate the unemployment -
inflation tradeoff, making policy manipulation more costly and less 
effective. Where appropriate, my own PBC test models will include 
explanatory variables for the Korea and Vietnam War years, as well as 
for quarterly changes in the Producer Price Index, which appear to be 
highly correlated with supply shocks and other fa6tors causing shifts 
in the i ntercept of the SP curve. 
~. A president's first duty is to get re-elected or to see his 
party's nomin~ .... lected president. Whether one assumes that a 
president derives his utility primarily from seeing hi s party's nominee 
elected president in the next election (as does Nordhaus) or that the 
need to be re-elected Cor to anoint a successor) is simply a powerful 
constraint on a president's pursuit of utility (as do Frey and 
Schneider), it is indispensable for PBC theorists to assume that a 
president strongly desires that his party's nominee be elected. 
A model of a presidential utility function seems to be in order. 
The one that I have postulated reveals my own assumptions about 
presidential utility to be closer to Frey's and Schneider's than to 
Nordhaus's, in that I view the need to win elections as an overriding 
constraint on utility rather than as an end in itself. The distinction 
may seem a fuzzy one, but it will become pertinent as we move on. The 
model is as follows: 
UTILITYpres = fCIDEOLOGY, POPULARITY, LEGACY) 
subJect to 
ACELECTION, INFLUENCE, NATIONAL MOOD) 
with all explanatory variables given in descendirig order of their 




to which a president's goals of implementing his ideological obJectives 
(IDEOLOGY), maintaining high approval ratings (POPULARITY) and being 
well - remembered by history (LEGACY) conflict with each other, as they 
may. The ELECTION constraint seems the strongest because if the 
president's party cannot maintain control of the White House after the 
next election, his ideologically-driven accomplishments may well be 
nullified by the next administration. The INFLUENCE constraint is 
itself a function of 1) the partisan and ideological composition of the 
House and Senate, since one would expect that, ceteris paribus, a 
president will be more likely to get what he wants legislatively from a 
Congress controlled by like-minded members of his own party than from 
an opposition-dominated Congress; and 2) the president's approval 
rating, since a popular president would presumably have an easier time 
setting the national agenda than an unpopUlar one. The NATIONAL MOOD 
constraint refers, at any point in time, to the relative receptivity of 
the general public to certain ideologically-motivated programs and ideas 
for instance, national health insurance, a balanced-budget amendment, 
or incrp.ased defense spending. As difficult as this model would be to 
express quantitatively, it nevertheless has important implications for 
PSC testing, as the following paragraphs will reveal. 
The assumption that the ELECTION constraint is so strong as to be 
overriding means that theoretically we still have an "office- motivated" 
president, but that a president whose approval rating is above the 
"threshold level" that Frey and Schneider speak of will no longer be 
office-motivated. Applying this toPBC theory, we see that a highly 
popular president would only attempt an election-year economic 
stimulation if such a stimulus were in line with his ideological and 
33 
J 
other goals. Because IDEOLOGY ranks highest among a president' s goals 
in this model and because election-year economic growth peaks do not 
seem a product of any particular ideology, we can conclude that a 
highly popular president would feel little need to manipulate the 
business cycle so that it peaks at election time. 
On the other hand, the INFLUENCE constraint affect s not only a 
president's ability to achieve his ideological goals but also his 
ability to satisfy his re-election constraint through an economic 
stimulus or by any other means. Although INFLUENCE is assumed to 
depend on the partisan and ideological composition of Congress and also 
on the president's approval rating, on page 33 I theorized that 
partisan control of Congress affects election - year economic policy 
considerably less than it affects other areas of policy. Hence, in 
the making of election-year economic policy, presidential influence 
comes to depend on the president's popularity. 
be testing shall take this factor into account. 
The PBC models I will 
We can reasonably expect that the ELECTION constraint will be 
greater when th e incumbent president, .rather than someone else, is his 
party's nominee, since an incumbent president and a different 
candidate are not perfect substitutes. 58 Another member of the 
president's party is likely to have somewhat different ideological 
goals than the president, and a president can no longer derive utility 
from POPULARITY after he has left office. Also, assuming that the 
self-interest axiom entail s that presidents are more interested in 
maximizing their own utility than in the long-term success of their 
party, it follows that a lame-duck president might prefer to pursue hi s 
own ideblogical goal s rather than do everything he can to help someone 
else get e lected president. The ELECTION constraint still applies to 
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a lame-duck president, but it is not nearly so strong as when the 
president himself is running for re-election. 
Combining the conclusions of these last three paragraphs, we see 
several reasons why a regular four-year presidential business cycle 
would be theoretically unlikely. The 22nd Amendment ensures that in 
every other presidential election year (barring any deaths in office, 
impeachments or resignations), an incumbent president will not be up 
for re-election. In addition, a president with a "popularity surplus" 
will have scant need to stimulate the economy in the election year; and 
a president with a severe popularity deficit will likely have 
insufficient influence with which to persuade Congress and/or the Fed 
to adopt expansionary policies in an election year. I see no reason to 
rule out the possibility of a four-year PBC altogether; but, to account 
for these circumstances, my empirical work will include alternate tests 
with dummy variables for "semi-popular incumbents" whose average third -
year approval ratings (as measured by the Gallup Opinion Index) lie in 
the range 40r.<POP~bOy' and whose willingness and ability to stimulate 
the economy are unmitigated by any of the above factors. Thus I will 
test both for a "pure" four-year cycle, a test that involves a strict 
~nterpretation of Assumption 3, and for a PBC for semi-popular 
incumbents. 
The Models 
In my empirical work I ran regressions for four different 
dependent variables: percent change in real GNP; percent change in 
ROI; and, on the policy-instruments side, the real structural deficit 
divided by potential GNP and the percent chan~e in the level of non -
borrowed reserves. The estimation method used in all cases was 
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Ordinary Least Squares. In all my regressions I used quarterly data 
from the post-World War II era. All of these models rely heavily on 
dummy variables, to distinguish between the performance of a dependent 
variable during the pre-election quarters and during the post-election 
quarters. The use of dummy variables to represent all 16 quarters or 
all four years of a presidential term eliminates the need for a 
constant term. Each dummy variable coefficient is itself a constant 
term for a particular quarter or year of a presidential term. 
In accordance with Tufte's claim that the Eisenhower 
Administration reJected stimulative interventionist policies, al l of my 
models include alte~nate specifications that omit all observations from 
the Eisenhower years (1953-1960). Those models begin with the first 
quarter of 1961 (1961/1). For simplicity's sake, all model s that 
include observations from the Eisenhower years will have an "an after 
the equation numbers (e.g., Equation 1.1a) and all models that omit the 
Eisenhower observations wi l l have a "b" after the equation numbers. 
With the GNP and ROI models, which are highly similar, I ran three 
basic tests for each, using different sets of dummy variables. The 
first of these tests contains 16 dummy variables, one to correspond 
with each quarter of a presidential term. The second test instead uses 
four yearly dummies. The fourth-year dummy always represents a 
presidentia l election year. The third test also uses yearly dummies, 
l but features two different sets of fourth-year dummies: one for years 
in which a semi-popular incumbent (as defined on the previous page) is 
running, and another for years in which a semi-popular incumbent is not 
running. 
The GNP tests. These tests cover the timeframe 1948/11 to 
1986/II1. The observations begin with 1948/Il because of limited data 
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availabili ty. 
The first equation takes the following form: 
• • • • • 
GNPt = fCGNP t _1, GNPt _2 , GNPt _3 , GNPt _4 , DUM1, DUM2, 
DUM3, ... , DUM16, VIET, KOREA, PRICE) ( 1. 1 ) 
The last three independent variables are there to help account for the 
economic fluctuations caused by wars and supply shocks and hence to 
help avoid spurious results. GNP = the percent changes in the level of 
real GNP, at annual rates of growth. DUMl = the first quarter of a 
presidential term, in which the president is inaugurated; DUM2 = the 
second quarter; DUM3 = the third quarter; and'so on. VIET = the semi-
annual change in total U.S. military personnel in South Vietnam; since 
these are semi-annual changes and the GNP data are quarterly, the value 
of VIET will be the same for successive observations that are within 
the same half-year (e.g., VIET = 2305 for 1961/111 and 1961/IV, 6695 
for 1962/1 and 1962/11, 2300 for 1962/111 and 1962/IV). Since similar 
data was not readily available for U.S. involvement in the Korean War, 
KOREA is a simple 0-1 dummy variable that equals 1 in all quarters in 
which the U.S. was a participant in the Korean War (1950/1 - 1953/111) 
and equals 0 in all other quarters. PRICE = quarterly average of 
monthly percent changes iri the Producer Price Index for industrial 
l commodi ties. The PRICE variable serves as a proxy for supply shocks; 
this particular price index includes fuels and related products, and 
l changes in it appear to be highly correlated with recent supply shocks. 
l 
Since wars are supposed to boost real GNP growth and adverse supply 
shocks are supposed to hinder real GNP growth, the expected 
coefficients of VIET and KOREA are positive and the expected 
coefficient of PRICE is negative. 




should be highest in the quarters directly before and including the 
election. Assumption 1 implies that the coefficients should be 
highest in quarters 13- 16, those of the election year, in order for the 
politicians to take full advantage of the voters' myopia. In 
accordance with the assumptions that voters have a decaying memory of 
past events and that politicians can manipUlate the economy through 
fiscal and monetary policy, one would also exp·ect higher GNP growth in 
the third year (quarters 9 - 12) than in the first and second years 
(quarters 1-8). 
The s econd GNP test uses yearly dummies and takes the form 
GNP t = fCGNP t _1 , GNPt _2 , GNPt - 3 , GNPt - 4 , YEAR1, 
YEAR2, YEAR3, YEAR4, VIET, KOREA, . PRICE) ( 1. 2) 
where YEARl. = 1 for observations from quarters 1-4 of a presidential 
term and 0 for quarters 5-16; YEAR2 = 1 for quarters 5-8, 0 for all 
others; YEAR3 = 1. for quarters 9-12, 0 for ~ll others; YEAR4 = 1 for 
quarters 13-16 and 0 for quarters 1-12. 
The third GNP test differentiates between election years in which 
a semi-popular incumbent is running (INCUM4) and all other election 
years CORDYEAR4): 
GNPt = f(GNPt_l.' GNPt _2 , GNPt - 3 , GNPt - 4 , YEAR1, 
YEAR2, YEAR3, OROYEAR4, INCUM4, VIET, KOREA, PRICE) (1.3) 
Of the ten presidential elections in the postwar U.S., four -- those of 
1948, 1972, 1976 and 1984 - - involved a semi-popular incumbent. 
The ROt tests. The three ROI models are nearly identical in 
specification to the GNP tests. I am testing for fluctuations in ROI 
growth as well as GNP growth because afFair's and Tufte's findings 
that per-capita ROI growth is the strongest indicator of presidential 




-- which Tufte al l eges are another tool of partisan politics -- and GNP 
does not. The RDI tests differ from the GNP equations in only two 
respects! 1) they begin with 1949/111, again because of the limited 
availability of the data; and 2) the KOREA variable has been removed, 
because Korean War activity does not seem to have appreciably affected 
RDI growth. 
The policy-instruments tests. In these tests I employ several 
additional specifications, including ones with interaction dummies to 
gauge whether these instruments react more strongly to slowdowns in GNP 
growth in pre-election quarters than in other quarters. Some of the 
monetary pol i cy specifications include a second interaction term, 
similar to that used by Allen, to test whether monetary policy becomes 
more accommodative of increases in the federal debt in the pre-election 
quarters. 
Since a l terations in fiscal and monetary policy instruments have a 
less-than-immediate impact on the economy, one must take into account 
the "effectiveness lags" of these policy instruments. The exact 
lengths of these lags are uncertairi and cause considerable disagreement 
among economists. Estimates of these lags indicate that a fiscal 
stimulUS has a small multiplier effect on the economy in the first 
quarter of its application and that its multiplier effect is largest 
anywhere from two to seven quarters later. Gordon estimates that a 
monetary stimulus acts with a "short but variable lag," ranging from 
five mont hs (two quarters) to ten months (four quarters). 59 Thus in 
interpreting the results of the fiscal and monetary models, we should 
look at the estimated coefficients of the dummies closely preceding 
the election quarter (quarter 16). In the context of these models, the 
election quarter ii:self is best viewed as a post-election quarter, 
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bec~use of the effectiveness lags. 
The fiscal policy test corresponding most closely to Equation 
(1.1) is as follows: 
FISCALt = f(FISCALt _ 1, DUM1, DUM2, DUM3, .•• , DUM16, ECONOMY, 
VIET, REAGAN) (3.1) 
where FISCAL = the real structural budget deficit, proJected at an 
annual rate, divided by real potential GNP; ECONOMY = the average 
percent change in real GNP growth over the previous four quarters; and 
REAGAN is a dummy variable equal to 1 in all quarters during which 
Reagan's 1981 tax cuts are in effect (I use as my starting point 
1983/11, the quarter in which the final phase of the tax cuts took 
effect) and equal to 0 in all previous quarters. The REAGAN dummy 
variable allows for the fact that even after adJusting for inflation 
and the size of potential output, the Reagan deficits (after the 1981 
tax cuts took full effect) are still so large as to be potentially 
significant outliers. The VIET variable accomplishes much the same 
purpose for the Vietnam-era deficits. 
A second fiscal policy test, Equation (3.2), uses yearly dummies 
and is similar to (1.2). A third fiscal policy test corresponds to 
(1.3), except that additional dummy variables (INCUM3 and ORDYEAR3) are 
added for the third year of each term, because of uncertainty about the 
length of the fiscal policy lag. (One could argue that a semi-popular 
incumbent president in the third year of his term does not know if he 
will be his party's nominee in the following year's election, but I 
think that contention is dismissible. 60 ) 
Equations (3.4) through (3.7) include interaction dummies to test 
whether countercyclical fiscal policy becomes more countercyclical in 
pre-election quarters than in post-election quarters. Equation (3.4) 
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takes th e form 
FISCALt = fCFISCALt _ 1, YEAR1, YEAR2, YEAR3, YEAR4, INTER1, 
INTER2, INTER3, INTER4, VIET, REAGAN) (3.4) 
where INTERCX) = ECONOMY*YEAR(X). Since countercyclical policy calls 
for an increase in the structural deficit in response to slowdown in 
reai GNP growth (ECONOMY), the expected coefficients of the INTER terms 
are negative. PBC theory predicts that the coefficients of INTER3 and 
INTER4 will be of a greater magnitude than those of INTERI and INTER2. 
Equation C3.5) replaces both pairs of third- and fourth-year 
dummi es with ORDYEAR3, ORDYEAR4, INCUM3, INCUM4, INTER3(o), 1NTER4Co), 
INTER3(i) and IN~ER4Ci). INTER3(i) and INTER4(i) denote interaction 
dummies for years in which a semi-popular incumbent is running. 
INTER3(o) and INTER4(o) denote interaction dummies for all other third 
and fourth years. 
Equation (3.6) uses quarterly interaction dummies and a singl e 
constant term in place of DUM1, DUM2, ..• , DUM16. 
Equation (3.7) is similar to (3.6), but makes a distinction for 
semi-popular incumbents in the quarters 9-15, which I define to be the 
pre-election quarters. 
Because of limited data availability, the FISCAL models begin no 
earlier than 1955/11. I expect, however, that the only models worth 
looking at will be those that omit the data from the Eisenhower years. 
l The raw data for 1955-1960 show that the Eisenhower Administration ran 
its largest budget surpluses in the election years 1956 and 1960, 
perhaps under the belief that surpluses and low inflation were what the 
voters preferred. (That pattern may well represent a unique PSC in 
itself~) The inclusion of the Eisenhower data in the FISCAL models 




The monetary policy models have as their dependent variable the 
percent change (from the previous quarter) in the level of non-borrowed 
reserves (RESERVES). The first of these equations takes the form 
RESER VESt = f(RESERVESt _ l , DUMl, DUM2, ••• , DUM16, 
ECONOMY, DEBTt _ l ) (4. 1 ) 
where debt equal s the proJected net change in the federal debt - -
equivalent to the current federal deficit -- in a given quarter. Since 
a deficit is expressed here as a positive number and a surplus as a 
negative number, a monetary policy that accommodated increases in the 
debt would yield positive coefficient estimates for DEBTt _ l in 
this and other equations. 
Monetary equations (4. 2 ) and (4.3) correspond to (1.2) and (1.3), 
in their respective use of yearly dummies, and semi-popular incumbent 
dummies for years three and four. Again, the INCUM3 and ORDYEAR3 
dummies are used because of uncertainties about the length of the 
effectiveness l ag. 
Equation (4.4) is most similar to (3 . 6), in that it regresses 
RESERVES on sixteen quarterly interaction variables and a constant term, 
as well as on RESERVESt _1 and DEBTt _1 . 
Equation (4.5) uses yearly interaction terms (INTERIY, INTER2Y, 
INTER3Y, INTER4Y); otherwise it is the same as (4.4). 
Equation (4.6) uses quarterly interaction terms and replaces 
DEBTt _1 with an additional set of interaction terms of the form 
DINTERI = DUM1*DEBTt _1, DINTER2 = DUM2*DEBTt _ l , and so forth. A 
positive coeffi.cient estimate for DINTER(X) means that in quarter X, the 
Fed's tendency is to monetize increases in the debt. PBC theory 
predicts that the coefficients of DINTER will be largest in the pre -




Equatton (4.7) retains the sixteen debt interaction variables but 
replaces the sixteen ECONOMY interaction terms with the single 
variable ECONOMY. 
Equatton (4.B) roughly corresponds to (3.7), in that it uses 
quarterly interaction terms and for quarters 9-lS uses separate 
interaction dummies for semi-popular incumbents and all other quarters. 
Unfortunately, the consistent data on non-borrowed reserves dates 
back only to 1959. One consequence of this limitation is that 
observatj.ons from all but seven quarters of the Eisenhower years are 
automatica l ly eliminated. Thus omitting the Eisenhower data will have 
virtually no impact on the monetary regression results. 
Test Results 
The GNP and ROI tests. Table 1 displays the results for Equations 
( 1 .1) and (2.1). These results provide some, but not much, support for 
a PBC. The t-statistics of the quarterly dummy coefficients in 
Equation (1..1a), which covers the full timeframe, are significant at a 
Sr. error l evel (i.e., at a 9Sr. level of confidence) in only 7 of the 16 
quarters and at a 20r. level in 11 of the 16 quarters. Thus they 
indicate that quarterly variations in GNP growth do not have a great 
deal of explanatory value. In Equation (2.1a), the t-values are 
significant at a Sr. level in IS of the 16 quarters, probably because of 
the generally high coefficient estimates; in Equation (2.1b), 12 of the 
16 dummy coefficients have t-values that are significant at the sr. 
level. In (l.la) and (1.1b), the estimated coefficients of the dummies 
tend to be somewhat higher in the pre-election quarters (quarters 9-16) 
than in the post-election quarters (quarters I-B), although the pattern 





I .. or~(NOrNT IICOr"rICOrICT 
vARIA8L[S I I. I. I ! I. I b I UUULI:I !cgol-d) 
r. NP t·l @iJ .306 1101\_1 12. II". 
r.NP, · 7 . 411 . 122 1101\_2 
II. f., 1 I I. 07' 
roN,., . J '. II J ·. 0277 1101\ -l 
f ,. ". 1'.24,11 
(iMP t . 4 - . 06911 1101\_4 
".64" 
II0I l _, 
~ . g 
I~· '4. ll • . 
I. '2 
I. f.," 1,9711' 
2.41 2.711 
I I. 711' '1.111' 
. ':)7 2.01 
1 . 4f.21 • I. 27. 
2.02 I. 14 
I I. 4" 10.72' 
J.OO 2.74 
12.24' • II. Ill. 
J.f.' 1.117 
r 2. ,., •• I I. 27. 
1.Jf. . I" 
1.9'7' I. 11)4' 
2. JO 2 . 04 
[QUATIOICS 
12. lal 12.1bl 
-.00400 -.0'24 







4. JO .~ 
• 2. ~~' . • 
'.10 







• 2. II ,. 
4.44 

























I I. 46' 




l . 4' 
II.U' 11.111' 
,.-:-;:-, \ ~
~l~\ !'l~ I' I I. 27. 11.21. 
~r;p.4 I 
( . 'J:2~~J 'J.:so, .• \ 
2. II .76 




t·.\.tiet,ce In p.r.nth •••• 
• . lndlcet ••• l.l'.~lc.l etonlflcenc •• t \h. 5. l_vel 
R(GR[SSION STATISTICS 
T, •• bound. 19411/11 IKIII 
' 19116/111 ·1916/111 
.... n nf " 
.t.p.nd.nt 'I 411 J. 47 
..,.," , ahl. 
OW I . ." 1.0. 
"w 
·1·' 
· 1 ~9 
Il.I". \ IJ.4111. 
\ .---------J 
~ 4.K I 
":~l ... 12 .• 6l'. I. 4. '79 ~
12.11". 12."' • 
.. - ;-----
.97 1'.'4 
". I~'· IIJ.OO •. • \ 
----~ , I 
- . 112£-04 .1194£-0" 
I I . or. • I. 914 • 







both of these equations, the highest coefficient estimates among the 
dummy variables are those of DUMI0, DUMll, DUM13, DUM16 and DUM1. 
(Viewed in the context of PBC theory, the high estimate of DUMl 
suggests that politicians may be overshooting their targets.) The 
lowest coefficient estimates in Cl.la) are for DUM2, DUM4 and DUMB. 
The lowest coefficient estimates in (1.1b) are for DUM5 and DUMB, but 
the values of DUM14 and DUM15 (two election-year quarters) are also 
quite low. The estimated dummy coefficients in the RDI tests (2.1a) 
and (2.1b) using quarterly dummies display somewhat less variation 
among each other and provide less evidence of a PBC. 
The test results present a clearer pattern when the GNP and RDI 
data are grouped into yearly dummies, in Equations (1~2) and (2.2). 
The t-statistics for the individual dummies become consistently 
signifi cant, and all four specifications - - (1. 2a), (1. 2b), (2. 2a) and 
(2.2b) -- lend some support to the PBC hypothesis. The estimates for 
Equation (1 .• 2b), covering real GNP growth in the post-Eisenhower years, 
indicates that GNP growth plummets almost 2 percentage points from its 
YEARl rate in YEAR2 and rises by 2 percentage points in YEAR3, staying 
at the YEAR3 level in the election year (YEAR4) and YEAR!. Thus the 
economy bottoms out in the second year of the term, a "post-election" 
year. The results for Equation (2.2b) are similar but better: RDI 
growth drops nearly 2 percentage points in YEAR2, rises by one-and-a-
l half points in YEAR3 and reaches its peak in YEAR4. Table 2 gives the 
test results for these models. 
L Using a t - test to determine whether the coefficients of YEAR2 and 
YEAR4 differ significantly, we see that their difference is significant 
at a lOX level in Equation (1.2b) and at a 5X level in (2.2b). 
When we replace the YEAR4 dummy with the ORDYEAR4 and INCUM4 
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dummies, the GNP and ROI models provide very strong support for the 
"semi-popular incumbent" version of the PBC hypothesis. Including and 
excluding the Eisenhower years, the coefficients of INCUM4 are the 
highest of all the dummy coefficients in the GNP and ROI models. In 
all four specifications - - (1.3a), (1.3b), (2.3a) and (2.3h) -- the 
estimated coefficient of INCUM4 is at least a point (usually two points) 
higher than that of OROYEAR4, suggesting that the presence of a semi -
popular incumbent in any given presidential election makes a big 
difference in the rate of income growth in the year of the election. 
(Indeed, the generally low coefficients of OROYEAR4 indicate that there 
is no PBe when a semi - popular incumbent is not running. ) In three of 
these specifications, income growth is slowest in the second year of 
the term, another observation that is consistent with a PBC. 
Again using t-tests to determine whether the INCUM4 coefficients 
differ significantly from those of the other yearly dummies, I find the 
differencps to be fairly substantial in all of the specifications. The 
noefficient di.fferences are clearest in Equation (1.3a), the GNP model 
covering 1948/11-1986/111. Table 3 presents the results of these t -
tests for all four specifications. 
One should note that the "cycles" in GNP and ROI growth that we 
observe in these results are not really business cycles per se, in 
which periods of recesston follow periods of expansion, because the 
dummy coefficients are never negative. Rather, these trends in income 
growth are patterns within ongoing business cycl~s. 
The fiscal policy tests. The results of the FISCAL tests 
provide weaker support for a PBC than do the GNP and RDI results. As 
expected, the specifications that omitted all observations from the 





than the models that used all available data back to 1955. (Equations 
C3.3a>, C3.5a) and C3.7a>, all of which included semi-popular-incumbent 
dummies, are the only exceptions to this rule.'> The FISCAL tests using 
yearly dummies perform better than those with quarterly dummies, and 
the coeffjcients of the interaction terms provide an additlonal 
measure of evidence of a PSC. 
Table 3 
RESULTS OF T-TESTS FOR COEFFICIENT EQUALITIES 
IN EQUATIONS (1.3) AND (2.3) 
"0: BJ = Sk' where BJPV and Bk are two 
r.:oeffiGients from the same equation. 
The t-statistl.cs are given in the table. 
EQUATIONS 
Cl.3a) ( 1. 3b) (2.3a) 
COEFFICIENT PAIR 
YEAR1, INCUM4 2.26 2.01 1. 39 
(5Yo) (5Yo) (20Yo) 
YEAR2, INClIM4 1. 03 2.38 .966 
C40Yo) (5Yo) (40Yo) 
YEAR3, INCUM4 1. 40 1. 75 1. 26 
(20Yo) (lOYO ) C40YO) 
ORDYEAR4, INCUM4 .641 2.03 .912 










The error levels of statistical significance are in parentheses. 
Equation (3.1b) gives somewhat mixed results. The highest 
coefficient estimates are those for DUM8, DUMI0, and DUMI4, and 
the only negative coefficient is for DUM1; but the t-values of these 




addition, a lthough DUMl has the only negative coeIIicient, th e next -
lowest coefIicients are those OI DUMll and DUMl5, two pre-election 
quarters. Thus the pattern is an inconsistent one. 
The tests using yearly dummies yield significant t - statistics Ior 
the dummies, probably due to the larger number of observations (and 
hence the smaller standard errors) that each dummy va~iable 
encompasses. In (3.2b) and (3.3a), the estimated coeIficient OI 
ECONOMY is negative and signiIicant at a 5~ level, indicating that 
fiscal policy tends to "lean against the wind." Table 4 gives the 
results of these two regressions. In Equation (3.2b), the YEAR4 
coefficient is highest and the YEARl coeIIicient is lowest, in 
accordance with a PSG; the diIference between the two is signiIicant 
at a 30% error level. In Equation (3.3a), the INGUM4 coeIficient is 
the highest and the INGUM3 coefficient is the next highest. The INCUM4 
and YEAR1 coefficients differ at a 10~ error level. The coefficients 
for ORDYEAR3 and ORDYEAR4 are by Iar the lowest, providing support for 
the "semi - papular-incumbent" version of a PSG. 
When yearly interaction dummies are added to the model, in Equation 
(3.4b), the original yearly dummies show l ess OI a PSG-like pattern; 
but we see that fiscal policy tends to be countercyclical in all years 
except the post-election YEAR1 and that it reacts most strongly to 
decelerations in the rate of real GNP growth in the pre-election YEAR3. 
Table 4 includes the regression result~ of this equation. 
Equations (3.5a) and (3.7a), which include separate interaction 
variables for semi-popular incumbents, prove very little. The 
responsiveness of fiscal policy to decelerations in GNP growth appears 
not to depend on whether or not a semi-popular incumbent is seeking re -





VARIABLES (3.2b) (3.3a) (3.4b) 
rISCAL t. - l . 768 .840 .739 
112.7). ( 18. 7). ClI.7). 
YEARI . 341 . 283 .0576 
r 2. 14) r 2. 141 • (.223) 
YEAR2 . 449 .379 . 534 
(2.92) • r 3 . 01)' r 3.01)' 
YEAR3 .419 . 582 
(2.76)' (3.22)' 
YEAR4 . 541 .377 
( 2. 88) • (1.301 • 
ORDYEAR3 . 149 
c. 894) 
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tNTER3 -. 120 
(-2.45) 
INTER4 -. 0129 
(-.231) 
VIET .220E-05 . 320E-05 • 239E-05 
(1. 46) (2.091. (1. 56) 
REAGAN .770 .505 . 824 
(3.15) • (2.211. (3.18" 
l t-atat1atics 1n parentheses 
l REGRESSION STATISTICS 
~EAN OF DEPENDENT 1. 19 0. 732 1. 19 
VARIABLE 
ow 2. 2 5 2 . 32 2.31 
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not perform as well as the tests using yearly interaction dummi es. 
The monetary policy tests. The results of Equations (4. 1), (4. 2 ) 
and (4.3) provide not a shred of evidence of an electorally- related 
pattern in the growth of non-borrowed reserves. Moreover, the low t -
statistics for the quarterly and yearly dummies indicate that these 
dumm ies do not even provide meaningful ways of grouping th e data. The 
rest of the monetary models use a constant term, the t-values of which 
are consistently significant. 
Those equations yield positive coefficient estimates for DEBTt - l, 
indicating that the Fed monetizes increases in the debt to some extent, 
but Equations (4.6) and (4.7) -- which include the quarterly debt-
interaction terms -- provide no evidence that the Fed' s willingness to 
monetize the debt varies with the electoral cycle. Aga:!.n, the t-
statistics for these individual variables are mostly insignificant. 
The monetary equations with an ECONOMY term yield negative and 
signifiCAnt coefficient estimates for this term, suggesting that the 
Fed responds countercyclically to fluctuations in real GNP growth. 
And, Judging from the results of Equations (4.4) and (4.8), it seems 
that the Fed' s willingness to "lean against th e wind" is th e on e aspect 
of monetAry policy that does indeed vary with the presidential cycle 
and a long th e lines of a PBG. 
Tables 5 and 6 display the regression results of (4.4) a nd (4.8). 
They show monetary policy to be countercyclical in almost every quarter 
except quarter 16, the first post-election quarter, in which policy i s 
highly procyclical. Moreover, policy is most strongly countercyclical 
(i.e., th e interaction term has the largest negative coefficient) in 
quarter 15, especially when a semi-popular incumbent i s up for re -
election. In (4.4A), INTERIO, INTER13 and INTER14 have relatively 
51 
Table 5 
COEFFICIENT ESTIMATES IN EQUATION (4.4a) 
INDEPENDENT INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLE COEFFICIENT VARIABLE COEFFICIENT 
C 1. 43 INTER9 -. 197 
(2.50)* (-.543) 
t - 1 RESERVES . -.053 INTER10 - .415 
( - .491) (-1.42) 
INTERl - . 132 INTER11 .0491 
( - .484) ( . 169) 
INTER2 - .273 INTER12 - .0726 
(-.997) (-.220) 
INTER3 - .0958 INTER13 - .324 
(-.322) ( -1. 09) 
INTER4 .17B INTER14 - .267 
( . 661 ) (-1.15) 
INTER5 - .251 INTER15 - .613 
(-1. 00) ( -2. 57'* 
INTER6 - . 193 INTER16 .561 
( - .701) (2.09)* 
INTER7 - .207 DEBTt - 1 .00912 
(-.722) ( 1. 78) 
INTER8 - .246 
(-.791) 
t-statistics in parentheses 
* - indicates statistical significance at a 5% error level 
l 
l J 


































( -1. 02) 
- . 182 







































( . 321 ) 
- .216 
(-.418) 
INTER13Ci) - .0370 
(-.100) 
INTER14 (i) - .474 
( -1. 75) 
INTER15(i) - 1.05 
( - 3.79)* 
DEBT t - 1 .0111 
(2.06)* 
* - indicates statistical significance at a 51 error level 
Mean of dependent variable = 1.22. DW = 1.91. 
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l arge negative coefficients as we l l. In (4.8a), the same i s true of 
INTER12(i) and INTER14(i). These test results are in no way 
spectacular -- indeed, the t-values for most of the interaction dummies 
are insignificant at even a 201 error level - - but the t-values of 
INTER15, INTER15(1) and INTER16 are significant at a 51 level and a 
pattern is apparent. 
Conclusion 
The r egression resu l ts for the models I constructed using macro -
aggregates (GNP, RDI growth rates) as the dependent variables and the 
models using pol i.cy inst.ruments as the dependent variables are far from 
symmetr:i. ca l. Tahle 2 presents impressive evidence that peaks in GNP 
a nd RDI growth are coincident with years in which a semi-popular 
incumbent president. seeks re-election, plus additional (though less 
striking) evidence of a regular four-year presidential business cycle; 
but the results of the fisca l and monetary regressions provide only 
mild support for the hypothesis that the government engenders such 
patterns. 
The fiscal - policy test results are more favorable to PSC theory 
than a r e the monetary results. This seems altogether logical, given 
that fiscal policy is more directly under politicians' control than 
monetary po l icy. Still, although the coefficient estimates of the 
fiscal equat.ions in Table 4 follow the pattern of a PBC, the fourth -
year coefficients do not differ from the other coefficients in these 
equations at the same high levels of statistical significance as the 
ones in t.h e GNP and ROI models (Equations (1. 3) and (2.3». In 
addition, the dummy coefficients often do not appear large enough to 
have a pronounced effect on the macroeconomy. 
The monetary regression results indicate that Fed policy is more 
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strong l y countercyclical in pre-election quarters than in post -e l ection 
quarters, hut too many of the quarterly dummy coefficients in these 
regress ions (Equations (4.4a) and (4.8a» are insignificant at even a 
20X error l evel. In addition, to say that the Fed' s policy at any 
given time is countercyclical means not only that it increases the 
growth of reserves when the GNP growth slumps, but also that it 
decreases the growth of reserves when the economy is booming. Hence 
the countercyclical policy that the Fed employs in pre-election 
quarters is sometimes a contractionary policy instead of an 
expansionary one. The absence of evidence of a cycle in the growt h 
rate of reserves in relation to political cycles alone, or in the 
Fed' s willingness to monetize changes in the debt, seems to say more 
about the connection (or lack thereof) between monetary policy and 
presidential elections than do the ECONOMY interaction dumm ies . 
If politicians are in fact attempting to create a politica l 
business cycle, then they do not go as far in this endeavor as they 
might. The resu lt s of the fiscal and monetary regressions provide some 
evidence that they try to e ngineer such cycles; but however 
irresponsible such attempt s may be, the damage they wreak on the economy 
seems altogether s l ight, because the policy changes seem too small to 
have any great impact. 
Thus we are left with strong evidence of a presidential business 
cycle in the trends in national income growth, but notably l ess 
evidence of a po l itical cycle in the making of fiscal and monetary 
policy. This is mu c h the s ame conclusion that I reached at th e end of 
my review ~f the previous PBC literature. It couid be that the economi c 




to governmental policy manipulations. The cycle could well be a polar 
opposite of Akerman's, one in which business and investor confidence 
ri ses i n anticipation of an upcoming election and falls after the 
election outcome i s settled. Perhaps firms and investors expect th e 
economy to do we l l in election years and adJust their plans for those 
years accordingly, and their increased investment has the usual 
multiplier effect. Whatever explanation one chooses, the "presidential 
business cycle" seems to arise from more than Just attempt s by 




APPENDIX: DATA SOURCES 
The vast maJority o£ the data I used in my empirical tests came 
£rom monthly issues o£ Business Conditions Digest (BCD)~ a 
publication o£ the U.S. Department o£ Commerce's Bureau o£ Economic 
Analysis. The BCD data included the £igures I used £or real GNP 
growth rates, RDI levels. the Producer Price Index £or Industrial 
Commodities. the unemployment rate and the in£lation rate (GNP 
de£lator). Because o£ an inconsistency between the pre-1985/II1 data 
£or GNP and RDI, which is given in terms o£ 1972 dollars, and the 
post-1985/III data, which is given in 1982 dollars, I £ound it 
necessary to de£late the latter £igures by a value o£ 2.131. A slight 
discontinuity still exists between the pre- and post-1985/II1 data, 
un£ortunately, because the latter £igures incorporated some other 
revisions besides the change o£ base years. I do not expect that the 
discontinuity is great enough to seriously a££ect the test results, 
however. 
The estimates o£ the structural de£icit and real potential GNP, as 
well as the GNP de£lator that I used to put the structural de£icit into 
constant-dollar terms, were obtained through the courtesy o£ the 
Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. This data ran £rom 1955/1 to 
1985/IV. 
The data £or non-borrowed reserves, which ran £rom January 1959 to 
March 1986, was provided by the Federal Reserve Board in Washington, 
D.C. This data is adJusted seasonally and also £or changes in reserve 
requirements. As mentioned in the text, I obtained the quarterly 
£igures £or non-borrowed reserves by comparing monthly averages £rom 
the £inal months o£ successive quarters -- i.e., £rom March, June, 
September and December. I multiplied the percent di££erences by 4 in 
order to put them in annual terms. 
The semi-annual Vietnam manpower figures are £rom Table IV of 
The Wars in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos, 1945-1982: A Bibliographic 
Guide, by Richard D. Burns and Milton Leitenburg (Santa Barbara, 
Cali£ornia: ABC-Clio Information Services, 1984). They obtained their 
£igures £rom the U.S. Department of De£ense. 
The Gallup Poll £igures which I used as the criteria for "semi-
popular incumbents" came from several compendiums o£ Gallup surveys: 
The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935-1971 (Volumes 1-3; New York: 
Random House, 1972); The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1972-1977 
(Volumes 1 and 2; Wilmington, Delaware: Scholarly Resources, 1978); 
The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion, yearly volumes from 1978 through 
1984 <Wilmington: Scholarly Resources. 1979-1985); and o££icial Gallup 
press releases from 1985. 
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